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Abstract 
Our study aims at analyzing Islamic banks efficiency over the period 2001-2008. We 
found that they were efficient at 78.9%. The level of efficiency could however vary according 
to regions. Asia displays the highest score with 84.64%. Indeed, country like Malaysia and 
Pakistan implemented reforms in order to allow Islamic banks to better cope with the existing 
financial system. On the contrary countries with Islamic banking system do not necessarily 
display efficiency scores superior to the average. Further analyses on commercial banks, in 
the selected countries strengthen the conclusion for a regulatory environment suiting Islamic 
banking. Besides, the subprime crisis did not impact Islamic banks as evidenced by the 
dummy variable. Market power and profitability have negative impact on Islamic banks 
efficiency. Concentration leads to higher costs through slacks and inefficiency. Again other 
results from robustness checks appear to stress the specificity of Islamic banks, like their first 
aim for financing rural population.  
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Introduction 
 
    Islamic banking is booming in Muslim and non-Muslim countries, since it is shariah 
compliant and is intended to Muslim clients in those countries. Although most of the Islamic 
banks are within Middle Eastern and Emerging countries, some universal banks based in 
developed countries have started to satisfy a large demand of Islamic financial products. It is 
the case in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
    In the past couple of decades, many developments in the Islamic world took place and 
favor the development and revival of Islamic finance. The recent unprecedented boost in the 
oil-related income of many Muslim Arab nations induces in those countries inflows of 
petrodollars. Then attacks of 11
th
 September 2001 and more recently the subprime crisis 
encouraged capital flight of Muslims (repatriation) and non-Muslims investors and financiers. 
The Golf region now captures a large concentration of liquidities. Lastly, in order to attract 
these liquidities to their financial markets, many occidental countries such as the UK, the 
USA and recently France encourage their banks offering Islamic banking services (see 
appendix 1 for more details). 
Several studies examined the development of this particular area of finance. In particular, 
some studies examined the risk that can pose Islamic finance to the international financial 
system, given the amount of petrodollars that they collect and the context of globalization. 
Sudararajan and Errico, 2002 discussed how to take into account the specificity of those 
institutions and their products in the management of financial risks; the same for Čihák and 
Hesse, 2008. They studied the possible channels through which Islamic finance could impact 
global financial stability. Lastly, Jobst, 2007 examined legal and economic implications of 
shariah compliance on the configuration of Islamic securitization transactions. 
 
Other studies assessed Islamic bank efficiency based on financial and management ratio or 
using parametric or non parametric methods, as done for conventional banks. For the first 
group of studies, one can cite Abdus-Samad, 1999; Bashir, 1999 and Hassan and Bashir, 
2003. Those papers focus most of the time on few banks in a country or a very limited 
number of countries. The second group of papers were written by Yudistira, 2003; Al-jarrah 
and Moulyneux, 2003, Hussein, 2004; Hassan, 2005. They studied a limited number of 
Islamic banks settled in one or several countries. Indeed, data on Islamic banks are scarce 
limiting such studies as well as comparative studies across countries. 
     
Islamic banking is growing in Middle East as well as in emerging countries. In those 
countries, financial authorities took reforms either to have a full islamization of their financial 
system or to allow Islamic banks to better compete with conventional banks. Our concern is 
therefore to measure Islamic as well as commercial banks efficiency to assess their evolution 
and determinants. Our study is made up with banks operating in 17 countries in Middle East, 
Asia and Africa, but also in United Kingdom. This scope of analysis will allow us to compare 
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Islamic banks efficiency through the differences characterizing those countries. We then make 
a comparison with a sample of commercial banks in the same countries. We used a stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA) over the period 2001-2008 to estimate a cost-efficiency frontier and 
derived scores of cost efficiency, while taking into account explanatory variables. Our results 
show that commercial banks are more efficient than Islamic banks, apart from countries 
where reforms where undertaken, in order to allow Islamic banks to better cope with the 
environment. The current paper is structured in the following way: Section (1) analyzes the 
results of previous studies about the performance and the profitability of these banks in 
Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Section (2) presents the model and the sample. The results 
are discussed in Section (3). We conclude in Section (4). 
 
1. Literature review and stylized facts on Islamic 
banking:  
 
 The market share of Islamic banks increases by 15% per annum (Moody's, 2008), this last 
decade. The emergence and boom of Islamic finance, lead several economist to write on this 
topic. Many studies discussed in depth about the rationale behind the prohibition of interest 
(Chapra, 2000), but also the policy implications of eliminating the interest payments (see 
among others Khan, 1986, Khan and Mirakhor, 1987 and Dar 2003). However, most of the 
existing literature on Islamic banking unleashes various studies made on the measurement of 
performance in Islamic banks: they examine the relationship between profitability and 
banking characteristics.     
A first group of studies are interested in the performance of Islamic banks in a specific 
country, through financial ratios. Those ratios capture (a) profitability, (b) liquidity, (c) risk 
and solvency and (d) efficiency. For instance, Saleh and Rami (2006) focus on the 
performance of the first and the second Islamic banks in Jordan: Jordan Islamic Bank for 
Finance and Investment (JIBFI) and Islamic International Arab Bank (IIAB). They notice that 
they play a major role in financing ventures in Jordan, particularly short-term investment, and 
both banks have increased their activities and expanded their investment but, the JIBFI still 
has higher profitability. They conclude that Islamic banks have high growth in the credit 
facilities and in profitability. Samad (2004) focused on the post Gulf War period of 1990-
2001 in Bahrain, and examined the performance of the interest-free Islamic banks and the 
interest-based conventional commercial banks. His study shows that there is no major 
difference between the two sets of banks in terms of profitability and liquidity performances 
but there is a significant difference in credit performance. Kader and Asarpota (2007) evaluate 
the performance of the UAE Islamic banks by comparing the Islamic and conventional banks. 
They examine the balance sheets and income statements of 3 Islamic banks and 5 
conventional banks between 2000 and 2004. Their results show that Islamic banks are more 
profitable, less liquid, less risky and more efficient than conventional ones. They conclude 
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that the SPL principle (see annex) is the main reason for the rapid growth of Islamic banks 
and suggest that they should be regulated and controlled in a different way as the two kinds of 
banks have different characteristics in practice. 
Again, Samad and Hassan (2000) performed an intertemporal study in which they compared 
the performance of the Bank Islamic Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) between two periods of time 
1984-1989 and 1990-1997. Then they evaluate the interbank performance by comparing the 
BIMB's performance with 2 conventional banks (one smaller and another larger than the 
BIMB) as well as 8 conventional banks. The results show that there is a significant 
improvement of the BIMB performance between 1984 and 1997 but this improvement is less 
important than in the conventional banks. Moreover, Islamic banks are less profitable and less 
risky but more liquid than conventional banks. Moin (2002) compared the performance of 
Islamic banks relatively to conventional banks in Pakistan. The study makes comparison of 
Meezan Bank Limited (MBL) which is the oldest Islamic bank in Pakistan and a group of 5 
conventional banks for the period of 2003-2007. He adopted an inter-bank analysis of the 
income statements and the balance sheets of the two groups. The study found that there is no 
difference in terms of liquidity between the two sets of banks. Besides, the MBL is less 
profitable, more solvent (less risky), and also less efficient comparing to the average of the 
conventional banks but it is improving considerably between 2003 and 2007. This is 
explained by the fact that the latter banks have a dominating position in the financial market 
with a longer history and experience than the Islamic banks in Pakistan which have started 
their business few years back. Sarkar (1999) studies the case of Islamic banks in Bangladesh. 
He finds that Islamic products have different risk characteristics and concludes that prudential 
regulation should be modified. 
Those studies related each to one country and using financial ratios tend to converge towards 
one conclusion. Islamic banks may be as efficient as conventional ones; however there is a 
necessity of reforms, regulation and control for each banking system where they operate.  
 
A second group of studies are interested in Islamic banks across several countries. Bashir 
(1999) and Bashir (2001) examined the balance sheets and the income statements of a sample 
of 14 Islamic banks in 8 Middle Eastern countries between 1993 and 1998. He analyzed the 
determinants of Islamic Banks' performance, specifically the relationship between the 
profitability and the banks' characteristics. He found that the measure of profitability is an 
increasing function of the capital and loan ratios. Besides, the study highlights the empirical 
role that adequate capital ratios and loan portfolios play in explaining the performance of 
Islamic banks. Factors such as non-interest earning assets and customer and short-term 
financing, etc contribute to the increase of the Islamic banks' profit. Hassan and Bashir 
(2003)
3
, confirm the results of Bashir (2001) in the sense that the performance of Islamic 
banks is affected not only by the bank's characteristics but also by the financial environment. 
                                                             
3 They consider a larger sample in 21 countries between 1994 and 2001 and use cross-country bank level data. 
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Their results indicate that controlling for macroeconomic environment
4
, financial market 
structure, and taxation; the high capital and loan-to-asset ratios improve the banks' 
performance. The study also provides an interesting but surprising results such as the positive 
correlation between profitability and overhead; and the negative impact of the size of the 
banking system on the profitability except net on interest margin. 
The third group of studies is interested in using efficiency frontier methods. Yudistira (2003) 
analyzed the impact of financial crises on the efficiency of 18 Islamic banks over 1997-2000. 
This study is based on a non-parametric approach Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). It 
assesses a technical frontier of efficiency composed of best practice banks. The efficiency 
score provided indicates how well a bank transform its inputs in an optimal set of outputs. He 
highlighted the small inefficiency scores of 18 Islamic banks as compared to conventional 
banks. Sufian (2007) adopted the same approach as Yudistira (2003) to examine the 
efficiency in domestic and foreign Islamic banks in Malaysia between 2001 and 2004. He 
provided evidence that these banks improve their efficiency slightly in 2003 and 2004. 
However, domestic Islamic banks are found marginally more efficient than foreign Islamic 
banks. Besides Islamic banks profitability is significantly and positively correlated to three 
different types of efficiency: technical, pure technical and scale efficiencies. 
Lastly, Mokhtar, Abdullah and Al-Habsh (2006) used the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) 
to measure and analyze technical and cost efficiency of Islamic Malaysian banks. Their 
findings show that, on average, the efficiency of the overall Islamic banking industry (full-
fledged Islamic banks and Islamic windows) has increased during the period of study while 
that of conventional banks remained stable over time. However, the efficiency level of Islamic 
banks is still lower than that of conventional banks. The study also reveals that full-fledged 
Islamic banks are more efficient than Islamic windows
5
 for local banks, while Islamic 
window of foreign banks tend to be more efficient than those of domestic banks.  
Those studies focus on one or a few countries. Our study will cover a large range of countries 
in Middle East, Asia, Africa and United Kingdom. Before our empirical assessment, we will 
analyze some statistics related to commercial Banks as well as Islamic Banks. Stylized facts 
in those regions show that conventional and Islamic banks tend to have roughly the same 
evolution in terms of activity (see figure 3). However, a more careful analysis reveals some 
differences. In Middle East, commercial banks profitability measured by return on Average 
assets_ ROAA_ (or average Equity) increase slightly (30%) relatively to their level of 2002, 
then decrease from 2007 with the subprime crisis. Profitability of Islamic banks grows more 
intensely (around 100%), and seems also to be affected by the subprime crisis. The share of 
equity to total assets decreases for commercial banks but not for Islamic banks, for which 
there is rather an increase after 2007 of almost 80%. Net interest margin decreases over the 
                                                             
4
 The Islamic banks seem to have higher profit margins in favorable macroeconomic environment. 
5
It refers to conventional banks that offer Islamic financial services, as part of their activity. 
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period for commercial banks over the whole period, but only after 2006 for Islamic ones, 
showing the increase of competitiveness. 
We have the same figure for Asia concerning profitability of commercial banks; however 
Islamic banks profitability is rather increasing after 2007. The decrease of ROAA, leads to 
less competitiveness. For both type of banks, net interest margin is increasing. The share of 
equity to total assets is decreasing for commercials banks while it keeps almost the same level 
over the period for their Islamic counterparts.  
African commercials banks profitability increases of 70%, after a fall in 2006. We have the 
same evolution for net interest margin, that increase of 20%, after a decrease of 10 % from the 
202 level. However the share of equity to total assets increases slightly. Data on Islamic 
banks, when available show an increase of this share (after a fall in 2004) as well as total 
assets which represent a proxy of their activities.   
Lastly, for United Kingdom, profitability of commercial banks increases after a fall in 2005, 
while it shows a regular growth for Islamic banks. The share of equity to total assets 
decreases for commercial banks but stays steady for Islamic ones. Besides, net interest margin 
is decreasing over the period for commercial banks. 
Those statistics reveal different evolutions among Islamic and commercial banks. Differences 
are also noticeable across the regions. They could be explained by the environment, but also 
reforms undertaken by financial and monetary authorities. As we previously said Islamic 
banking flourish in those regions. However, their implementation followed different paths, 
depending on countries. Iran and Sudan chose the full islamization of the banking system 
through respectively the enactment of the 1983 Usury Free Banking law and the promulgation 
of the 1992 Banking Law. On the other hand, some Muslim countries have allowed mixed 
financial system. Sole (2007) pinpoints the importance of respecting gradual steps in the 
process. Those steps were undertaken by Malaysia whose banking system is successful in 
attracting capital both from international investors, as well as the local Muslim population. In 
its concern to provide a favorable environment to Islamic banking, Malaysian authorities 
followed four stages. (1) In 1963, a small Islamic saving fund was allowed to operate. Then 
after the enactment of the 1983 Islamic Banking Act, the first Islamic bank (Bank Islam 
Malaysia Berhard) was granted a full-fledged banking license and started operations. (2) 
Conventional banks began opening Islamic windows under a pilot program that imposed 
certain restrictions, such as no commingling of funds. (3)  After a certain period of operating 
Islamic windows, some conventional banks accumulated a sufficient critical mass of Islamic 
customers to make viable a full conversion of the bank into an Islamic institution. (4) Lastly, 
the government introduces other Islamic financial institutions and markets.  
Besides, financial authorities should play their supervisory and regulatory role as Islamic 
banking may present the same risks than conventional banks: moral hazard consideration, 
safeguarding the interests of demand deposits but also systemic considerations. They also 
hold a decisive developmental role, as they can foster an environment where Islamic banking 
can offer a suitable response to customers’ demands for Islamic products. Indeed a level 
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playing field should be provided. For example, British Financial Services Authority has a 
policy of “no obstacles, no special favours”, allowing customers of Islamic banks to have the 
same level of regulatory oversight than those of commercial banks.        
 
Our empirical analysis aims at assessing efficiency of Islamic as well as conventional banks 
in those countries. Also, we will analyze the determinants of their efficiency basing our 
reflection on sensitive variables cited in the literature of Islamic banks efficiency. 
 
2. Model specification and Data 
 
2.1 Methods of efficiency measurement 
Efficiency is a concept that is close to the economic logic insofar as it involves the 
optimization of behaviour. It’s Farell (1957) who first defines technical efficiency 
measurement as the deviation from an ideal isoquant. We then have two perspectives. On the 
one hand, the maximization of outputs produced from a combination of available inputs 
(output-oriented measure). And on the other hand, the use of minimum quantities of inputs to 
produce a given quantity of output (input-oriented measure). In both cases the idea of 
optimization comes from the desire to avoid waste and to be as efficient as possible in 
achieving the objectives. Measuring the efficiency of banks leads to determine their level of 
performance in terms of distribution of financial services, based on inputs they use. Methods 
for efficiency measurement used in the literature, indicate this ability of banks, since they 
allow calculation of composite indices to take into account this capacity. Islamic banks are 
different from conventional banks, in that they reject any financial activity involving the 
interest perception or financial transactions related to unethical activities (weapons, tobacco, 
alcohol ...). Because the scope of their intermediation activity is redefined and limited, we are 
led to raise the issue of their efficiency in the distribution of such financial services.  
There are two main methods in the literature for efficiency measurement: (1) the non-
parametric approach which comes in two ways: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free 
Disposal Hull (DFH) analysis and (2) the parametric approach which has three variants: the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) and the Distribution 
Free Approach (DFA). The first method is a mathematical linear programming, which 
determines an envelopment surface composed of banks of best practices. The efficiency index 
is derived by reference to any deviation from the ideal surface. The second method is more 
accurate than the first one, because it is possible to estimate econometrically the frontier and 
separate the error term from the inefficiency term. However, it imposes a functional form to 
the efficiency frontier. This frontier function may be a Cobb-Douglas, a Constant-Elasticity-
Substitution or a Translog, depending on the technological form of the firm’s production. The 
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inefficiency term derived from the estimate is subsequently used to calculate the efficiency’s 
score. 
 
2.2 Implementing the stochastic frontier analysis 
In the current study, we retain the parametric approach and use more specifically a stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). It has the advantage of being more accurate than the nonparametric 
approach like DEA. As we explained it before, it allows separating the error term of the 
inefficiency term. It is therefore less sensitive to measurement errors and outliers
6
.  
As objective function, we choose a cost function. It allows taking into account the constraints 
of banks as financial companies, seeking to optimize their financial performance. Thereby 
minimizing the costs induced by the efficiency frontier, we will take into account this 
constraint. As functional form, we choose the Translog, as it best suits the multi-products 
characteristic of banking technology, involving multiple inputs and outputs, cf. Mester 
(1997), Bauer et al. (1998), Roger (1998) and Isik and Hasan (2002). Regarding the 
distribution of error and inefficiency term, studies have been made with different 
assumptions. Meusen and van den Broeck (1977) assume an exponential distribution for the 
inefficiency term, while Stevenson (1980) and Greene (1990) proposed a gamma distribution. 
Finally, Cebenoyan, Coopermann, Register and Hudginns (1993) prefer the semi-normal 
truncated distribution. However, Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) and Bauer et al. (1998) 
showed by a detailed literature review that the semi-normal distribution has become the 
standard assumption. Moreover comparative studies showed that the different assumptions 
about the distribution of the error term have no impact on the final results. Therefore, we will 
assume a semi-normal truncated distribution, while the random error follows a normal 
distribution. We use the maximum likelihood method for the estimate. Panel data allow us to 
gain in estimation accuracy by increasing the number of data. However, our data are 
unbalanced as some banks are not observed at certain points in time. 
 
a) Choice of inputs and outputs related to Islamic banks 
 
Estimating efficiency frontier requires the choice of inputs and outputs used and produced by 
Islamic banks. The literature on banking activities, propose two competing approaches: the 
production approach and the intermediation approach. In the first one, bank is expected to 
produce transaction services and information. Products consist of bank accounts opened by 
                                                             
6 We use SFA instead of TFA or DFA, because the last one although easy to implement, leads to poor 
information. DFA requires the assumption that cost efficiency is time invariant. Besides, when the time period 
of the panel is short, the random noise terms may not average 0, and substantial amounts of random noise will 
appear in the cost inefficiency error component.  
9 
 
the bank to manage loans and deposits. Thus bank output is measured in number of accounts 
or transactions. In the intermediation approach, banks are supposed to simultaneously offer 
safe and liquid deposits on the one hand and on the other hand, loans that are riskier and less 
liquid assets. Under this approach, bank products are expressed in monetary amounts of 
deposits, loans and other financial assets. Then banking costs relate to operating costs and 
financial costs. We will use the intermediation approach as it is widely used in the literature. 
It also assesses bank efficiency as a whole. Besides, the principle of Islamic banking is 
participation in the company that is using the funds on the basis of SPL principle. Therefore, 
the intermediation approach emphasizes intermediation function carried out by Islamic banks. 
 
This led us to determine as inputs labour, physical capital and deposits. The prices of those 
inputs are measured respectively by personnel expenses/total assets (PERSONEXP), other 
expenses/ total assets (OTHEREXP) and income for deposits/total deposits 
(INTERESTEXP). For outputs, we have net loans (LOANS), net liquid assets (LA) and total 
earning assets (SECURITIES). This classification is justified by the fact that Islamic banks 
engage in other types of profitable activities, since they do not charge interest on loans and 
deposits (see table 3). Thus, the computed model for the cost frontier function will be as 
equation 1 that follows: 
lnCT ijt  0 
m
n
m lnpm ,ijt 
s
t
s lnys,ijt  1/2
m
n

n
m
m ,n lnpm ,ijt lnpn,ijt 
1/2
s
t

t
s
lnys,ijt lnyt,ijt 
m
n

s
t
m ,z lnpm lnys,ijt  uijt  v ijt
           (1) 
where pm and pn are input prices and ys and yt are outputs quantities. Because of the specific 
form of the cost frontier function, we impose constraints on symmetry, αm,n= αn,m and βs,t = βt,s 
homogeneity in prices  Σmαm =1 and adding-up  Σmαm,n =Σnαn,m = Σmδm,s =0. We also consider 
homogeneity constraints by normalizing total cost, the labor price and physical capital price 
by financial capital price.  
The composite error term also takes a specific functional form. The random components, vijt 
are independently and identically distributed according to standard normal distribution, 
N(0;ζv
2
) while the bank inefficiency components, uijt > 0 are independently but not identically 
distributed according to a truncated-normal distribution. The Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
assumes that the inefficiency component of the error term is positive; that is, higher bank 
inefficiency is associated with higher cost. 
The inefficiency of bank i in country j at time t is defined as exp (ûijt) where ûijt is the 
estimated value of uijt. However, only the composite error term εijt = vijt - uijt can be observed 
from estimation of the cost function. The best predictor of uijt is therefore the conditional 
expectation of uijt given εijt = vijt - uijt. To retrieve the inefficiency component from the 
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composite error for each bank from the cost function estimation, we use the method of 
Jondrow et al. (1982) to calculate the conditional expectation. 
 
To estimate the stochastic efficiency frontier, measures of bank inefficiency, we use the 
Frontier econometric program developed by Coelli (1993). A second step regression will 
consist in regressing the inefficiency scores from the first step method on determinants of 
efficiency in Islamic banks.  
 
b) Choice of variables that explain cost-efficiency: 
 
The variables influencing efficiency and therefore enabling to explain it, are related to 
characteristics of the banking firm and its production process, as well as the environment in 
which banks operate. The size of the bank has often been used in the literature as 
determinants of efficiency. Allen and Rai (1996) showed that large banks can take advantage 
on economies of scale by sharing costs in the production process. It is measured by the 
logarithm of total assets. The same authors and more specifically, authors that have worked 
on Islamic banks such as Yudistira (2003) take into account regulatory and competitive 
conditions under which banks operate. Thus a variable used to catch profitability of banks is 
measured by net income/total assets (ROA) (or net income/equity (ROE)); and for Risk 
Taking Propensity we used the ratio equity/total assets. Indeed, Islamic banks refrain from 
charging interests on loans and deposits to devote themselves to the principle of PLS. This 
redefinition of the banking practices lead to new risks that conventional banks do not incur. 
Hence, there is a double interest here in our study to assess the impact of their risk taking 
propensity on efficiency (see table 3). 
Another variable that could have an impact on efficiency is the market share. It is measured 
by the ratio of total deposits of the bank/total deposits in the whole banking system. It can 
increase costs for the banking system in general because it results in slacks and therefore 
inefficiency that can not be solved. However, it can have a positive impact on efficiency, if it 
is the result of consolidation and market selection of the largest and most efficient banks. It 
appears therefore through lower costs, providing the market is contestable. The GDP per 
capita is a proxy of the level of development. It influences many factors related to demand 
and supply of banking services, mainly deposits and loans. Therefore, countries with a higher 
level of development are supposed to have more developed banking system, with more 
competitive interest rates and profit margins. Demand density for banking products (measured 
by deposits per square kilometre), has a negative impact on costs. In countries with high 
demand density, banks support lower costs in the distribution of banking products. Again, the 
provision of banking services may be affected by population density. In countries where this 
variable is low, banking costs are higher and banks are not encouraged to increase their 
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efficiency. We will test whether those variables are significant or not, according to their 
relative correlation. 
 
 
c) Data sources:  
We used data from balance sheets and income statements in their standard universal version 
of Database Bankscope. The values of the variables are expressed in current dollars and have 
been deflated by the consumer price index of the current year in order to reflect 
macroeconomic differences among countries. The macroeconomic variables come from 
International Financial Statistics, from the IMF, available through DataStream. Total deposits 
in each country for the calculation of market power were converted into dollars using market 
exchange rate end of period.     
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
Our regression is based on unbalanced panel data of 17 countries from Middle East (Iran, 
Jordan, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen), from  
Asia (Pakistan, Malaysia, Turkey, Brunei), from Africa (Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia), but also 
from United Kingdom. This later country has a few Islamic banks where Muslims immigrants 
can have financial services. Including these banks in our sample allow us to see how well they 
perform relatively to their counterparts in country where Muslims are not the minority. The 
covered period is 2001-2008, which allows us to analyze the impact of subprime crisis on 
Islamic banks efficiency; and the total number of observations is 340. Even if the temporal 
dimension of our panel is short and barely captures temporal effects, we enjoy other benefits 
of panel regression, ie flexibility in modeling differences between banks. Precisely to reflect 
the heterogeneity of data, we first led Haussmann test to determine the specification of the 
panel model (Table 2). The probability of the test being greater than 10% threshold, it does 
not allow us to discriminate which of the fixed effects model and random effects model is best 
suited to the data. However, statistical observations allow us to choose the most appropriate 
model. For all variables in the model, the Within-variance is inferior to the Between-variance 
(see Table 3). Similarly, the short period of analysis leads us to prefer the random effects 
model. Our choice is reinforced by the idea that the random effects model allows us to take 
into account the one sided error term of the inefficiency for each Islamic bank.  
 
We first estimate an efficiency frontier with the 3 inputs formerly presented in Section 2. 
However, the cost of deposits which is the income paid to depositors for Islamic banks, is not 
indicated in the financial statements provided by Bankscope for all banks in the sample. 
Therefore, estimate of the frontier, taking into account these three inputs reduces the number 
of available data for estimating and the γ coefficient is not significant. This reflects the non-
existence of the efficiency frontier. This leads us to estimate the efficiency frontier by 
considering as inputs “Personnel Expenses” and “Other Expenses”, the latter used to 
normalize “Total costs” and “Personnel Expenses”, in order to respect homogeneity 
constraints. Results appear in table 1.  
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Table 1 hereafter 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of Islamic banks efficiency over the period 2001-2008. It is 
growing, with an average of 78.9%. Differences in efficiency scores emerge among regions: 
Asia shows the highest one (84.64%). This level reflects the strong performance of Malaysian 
and Pakistani banks that constitute most of our Asian sub-sample. Malaysia in particular is 
emerging as one of the most developed centers in Islamic finance, after Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
Since 1975 the government has reformed the financial system, so that it promotes the 
development of Islamic banking alongside conventional finance, as indicated above. This was 
especially possible through the Malaysian Islamic Banking Act of 1983. For the Pakistani 
case, since 1978, the government has fostered the transformation of the banking system 
through the constitution of Commission for Transformation of Financial System (CTFS), and 
the establishments of Islamic Banking Department by the State Bank of Pakistan. Thus the 
government accompanied and framed this transformation through an appropriate regulatory 
system.   
 
 
Figure 1 hereafter. 
 
 
Besides, Islamic banks operating in Africa displayed an average efficiency score of 81.24%, 
with 81.16% for Sudan whose banking system is fully Islamic (government legislation). 
Middle East region has an efficiency score of about 80.39%. Especially, Iran which banking 
system is essentially Islamic (government legislation) displays an average efficiency of 
81.95%. For Saudi Arabia, we have 79.65% as efficiency score. Finally, Islamic banks 
operating in United Kingdom have an average efficiency score of 73.36%. It is the lowest 
one, despite efforts made by British authorities to include in its banking regulation, specific 
rules for Islamic banks to better exercise in the British environment.  
 
The second step of our analysis is to investigate what explain this efficiency across regions 
and countries. At this purpose we regressed efficiency scores on explanatory variables 
mentioned above. Scores efficiency evolving between 0 and 1, we use a Tobit model with 
double truncation. Results are presented in table 5 (regression 1).     
 
Size (logarithm of Total Assets) of the bank is not significant. ROA (Net Income / Total 
Assets) is a measure of banks profitability impact on efficiency. On a theoretical point of 
view, the most profitable banks are the most efficient ones. The coefficient of this variable is 
negative, indicating a negative impact of profitability on efficiency. Allen and Rai, 1996 
explained this by the reduction of costs agency due to moral hazard, for small banks with 
specific activities. This explanation could also be applied to Islamic banks which are specific 
in their activities and the way they generate profits. Lastly, “Market Power” (Bank 
Deposits/Total Deposits of the whole banking system) has a negative significant impact too 
on efficiency. This implies that concentration increases costs for banks through slacks and 
therefore leads to inefficiency. 
 
We also run robustness tests, to check the stability of our results, table 5 (regressions 2-7). 
Since 4 banks in our sample are located in United Kingdom, we estimated the efficiency 
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frontier without them. This regression is displayed in table 5 (regression 2). The results are 
qualitatively the same. A second robustness test consisted in including in the regression 
explanatory variables related to the macroeconomic environment (following Hassan and 
Bashir, 2003) in order to control this aspect on the efficiency measurement. Despite, the 
strong correlation among the explanatory variables as shown by table 4, we run the Tobit 
model (table 5, regression 3 and 4) including per capita GDP (GDPc), population density 
(DPOP) (or the percentage of urban population, URBANPOPPERC) and the propensity to 
take risk (RISKTAKING). Results are qualitatively the same than the regression 1. However, 
ROA is no more significant even if the sign of the coefficient remains negative. Population 
density has a negative significant impact on efficiency, while urban population percentage is 
not significant. GDP per capita has a negative impact on efficiency which is not consistent 
with the literature. Islamic banks evolving in less developed countries are more efficient, 
possibly because they were first designed as rural banks. Size has a positive coefficient when 
significant in regression 4, implying the existence of scale economies. Lastly, RISKTAKING 
variable is not significant for our sample of Islamic banks.  
 
Again, regressions 5 and 6 in table 5 show qualitatively the same results for the sample 
without Islamic banks in the UK. The coefficient of URBANPOPPERC is significant with a 
negative coefficient, meaning that Islamic banks operating in countries with less important 
urban population tend to be more efficient.  
 
Our last robustness test consisted in checking whether some dummies variables were 
significant (regression 7). Dummy variable related to Middle East (D_middle_East) and to the 
Islamic banking system as government legislation (D_islamicbkgsystem) are not significant. 
Dummy variable related to the United Kingdom (D_UK) has a negative and significant 
impact on efficiency, meaning that banks operating in United Kingdom are less efficient. This 
is consistent with the lowest average efficiency score, among regions.  Lastly dummy variable 
related to the subprime crisis (D_subprime) has a positive and significant coefficient. Those 
years of subprime crisis were conversely to commercial banks, good years for Islamic banks. 
Indeed their efficiency improved as shown in figure 1. Such a result could corroborate the fact 
that Islamic banks weren’t affected by the crisis, as suggested in the literature.  
  
 
Table 5 hereafter 
 
To deepen our analysis, we estimate cost frontier efficiency of commercial banks in all 
countries surveyed, except the countries whose banking system is wholly Islamic. Our first 
idea was to estimate a common frontier for Islamic and commercial banks. But even if we 
tried to define the corresponding inputs and outputs between the two types of banks, the 
estimated border did not exist. Thus, we chose to estimate a cost frontier of 156 commercial 
banks of comparable size to Islamic banks. The estimated efficiency score is 82.50% on 
average over the period. It is superior to the average Islamic banks efficiency score previously 
estimated. It is also growing over the period, as the efficiency of Islamic banks, indicating that 
both types of banks react quite identically to changes in their environment. The average 
efficiency over the period is substantially the same across regions. Thus, commercial banks in 
the Middle East have an efficiency of 82.66%, 82.38% in Africa, 82.34% in Asia and 82.28% 
in United Kingdom.  
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Figure 2 hereafter. 
 
 
Even if efficiency scores of commercial and Islamic banks are not assessed with the same cost 
frontier, we note nevertheless that, commercial banks are generally more efficient than 
Islamic banks. Except for the Asian region, where the authorities implemented reforms to 
enable Islamic banks to adapt to the environment, as we previously underlined. In other 
regions, it is clear that Islamic banks are struggling to be as effective as commercial banks. 
Lastly, table 6 shows that the determinants of commercial banks efficiency in these countries 
are mainly Return on Equity (ROE) which is a proxy for profitability and market power 
(MARKETPOWER). The latter has a positive coefficient indicating that the most efficient 
commercial banks push out of the market or acquire (by consolidation) less efficient ones, 
since they have the lowest costs because of scale economies. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Islamic banks have expanded significantly in recent years, because of increasing petrodollars 
inflows, following the oil shocks. These banks are growing at a rate of 15% per year since the 
early 2000s. And wherever they settle, the authorities try to implement adequate regulation in 
order to enable them to integrate the banking system of these countries. It is within this 
context that our study is inserted, to measure and understand what explains the efficiency of 
these banks.  
 
At this purpose, we use the method of stochastic frontier in a first step. Then in a second step, 
we estimate a Tobit model with the efficiency scores derived from the previous estimation 
and explanatory variables for efficiency that we found consistent to Islamic banks. While size 
hasn’t a significant coefficient, profitability and market power have negative impact on 
Islamic banks efficiency. Those results corroborate the thesis according to which there is a 
reduction of costs agency due to moral hazard, and that concentration increases costs for 
banks through slacks and therefore leads to inefficiency. Our robustness checks tend to 
support those results. However, in addition some interesting results are to be underlined. 
Apart from the positive coefficient of GDP (consistent with the literature), the percentage of 
urban population has a negative impact on efficiency. This finding tends to support the idea 
that Islamic banks are more efficient and active in countries with a small urban populaition. 
Dummy for banks operating in UK is consistent with Islamic banks score efficiency of the 
sub-sample. Dummy related to years of subprime crisis has a positive impact consistent with 
the literature and the increase of Islamic banks efficiency despite the crisis.  
 
Concerning the level of efficiency it is growing over the period of analysis, with an average of 
78.9%. However, there are noticeable differences in efficiency scores among regions. Asia 
shows the highest one (84.64%), due to overrepresentation of Pakistani and Malaysian banks. 
Islamic banks operating in Africa displayed an average efficiency score of 81.24%, greater 
than Middle East (80.39%). Indeed, Islamic banks settled in countries with Islamic banking as 
legislation do not necessarily displayed the highest level of efficiency. Finally, Islamic banks 
operating in United Kingdom have the lowest average efficiency score (73.36%).  
 
Further analysis showed that commercial banks in the selected countries tend to be more 
efficient on average than Islamic ones, despite the separate cost frontiers. This result, 
corroborate the idea that in countries like Pakistan and Malaysia where reforms were taken to 
improve the competitiveness of Islamic banks and allow them to better cope with the 
environment, they have higher scores efficiency. Therefore, more reforms are necessary in 
other countries to improve Islamic banks efficiency.    
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Appendix 1: An overview on Islamic Banking 
 
A. Islamic Banking system 
More generally Islamic finance can be included in the larger concept of ethical finance. It 
consists I integrate in extra-financial criteria (ethical, solidarity, environment and governance) 
in investment decisions and portfolio management. More specifically, Islamic banking has 
been defined as banking in consonance with the ethos and value system of Islam and 
governed by the principles laid down by Islamic law called the Shari'ah.   
  
A.1 The banking principles in Islamic Finance 
 
The Shari'ah is "Way to the water". The "way" of Islam in accord with: 
    The Qur'an and the Sunna
7
 and the Hadith
8
 (which are the source of Islamic laws), and 
Ijma'
9
, Qiyas
10
 and Ijtihad
11
 (which are used to provide interpretation), facilitate future 
development and implementation of the Islamic judicial system (Pervez, 1990). 
    Islamic banking is expected not only to avoid interest-based transactions, prohibited in the 
Islamic Shari'ah, but also to avoid unethical practices and participates actively in achieving 
the goals and objectives of an Islamic economy. Business and investments made must be 
conducted in a responsible and committed way. 
    There are four basic principles in the Islamic banking: 
1. The sharing of profit and loss (hereafter SPL) principle. When meeting between a 
capital provider and an entrepreneur, the principle of participation condemns 
compensation in the form of interest on capital contribution (riba). Indeed, Islamic 
morality regards as unfair that the provider of capital does not enjoy large profits 
                                                             
7
 It is the second source of Islam faith, refers to Prophet Mahomet's acts and words which are related to his 
practice of faith. It explains and transmits the Qur'an. 
8
 They refer to tradition or stories of the Prophet. In contrast with the Sunna which was practiced, the Hadith 
are records of what was practiced. They have become a controversy between Islamic groups since there are 
many interpretations of them. 
9
 It is the consensus of the Islamic community, umma. It is through his principle that democracy makes its 
impact on the conduct of Islamic polity. 
10 It is a deductive analogy by which a jurist applies to a new case a ruling made previously in similar cases. 
11 It is independent judgment provided by scholars of Islamic laws for which clear principles and procedures are 
stipulated in the Qu'ran and Sunna. 
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that could be achieved if the contractor receives a fixed fee. And conversely, that 
the lender can require full remuneration even if the project has led to losses. The 
sharing of profits and losses binds the provider of capital and the entrepreneur, 
while providing insurance for the entrepreneur from the pooling of risks that this 
entails. This also has the advantage in terms of resource allocation and efficiency: 
the fund provider has interest to know the borrower and interest in this project. 
Similarly, the fact that the financier will be interested in the result pushes to 
oversee the work of the contractor and ensures that it has no illegal activity.  
2. There are "some" risks (proportional to the efforts) shared by all the partners, 
whether funds are used in commercial or productive ventures. According to the 
Islam vision, the risk is necessary to justify a fee but it is prohibited if it is not 
controllable. The purpose of the contract should exist, be known and assessed at 
the conclusion of the agreement to protect against the imbalance of the transaction 
(gharar). 
3. All funds should preferably finance socially productive activity. The bank can 
therefore not engage in alcoholic beverage trade or in the pork meat trade or any 
other activities explicitly prohibited by the Islamic law. 
4. The prohibition of Usury (the collection and payments of interest, commonly 
called the Riba). Islamic finance deals only with certain aspects of conventional 
finance. Indeed according to the Shari’ah, the cardinal sin of economic activity is 
the riba. It is the undue increase of wealth. The collection of remuneration without 
effort or risk is prohibited. Therefore, no contract between economic agents must 
disclose directly or indirectly paid or received interest by any of the contractors. A 
compensation is fair only if it is the counterpart of a real job. Instead, it is possible 
to calculate the profit of an economic agent on the basis of the rates on the 
conventional market. Similarly, contracts to receive a variable remuneration or the 
occurrence of an event are likely to generate a rating imbalance of the transaction, 
(gharar). 
These principles are accompanied by strong constraints that must be taken into account in the 
commercial and financial arrangements. According to cases, conventional finance will 
provide tools to meet them. Often, there will be established a specialized engineering to 
combine several techniques to achieve the goal under the constraints imposed. 
Those financial products are designed in order to eliminate in economic transactions Riba as 
well as many others such as Gharar (risk or uncertainty) and Qimar (speculation). (has been 
rewritten for a better transition) 
    A depositor in an Islamic bank can therefore make earnings on his or her deposit in several 
ways: 
 Through return on his capital if it is employed to finance an investment. 
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 Through profit's sharing if his capital or a share of his capital is employed in a 
partnership. 
 Through rental earnings on an asset that has been partially financed by his capital. 
It is clear from the foregoing that there are five basic Islamic financing contracts that are 
permissible by the Islamic Shari'ah: cost plus (Murabaha)
12
, leasing and lease purchase (Ijara 
and Ijara wa-Iqtina)
13
, leasing structured mode (Istinsa)
14
, profit sharing (Mudaraba) and 
equity participation (Musharaka)
15
. 
A.2 Categories of Islamic banks 
    There are five categories of operating Islamic banks (Al-Omar et all., 1996): 
 The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) which has a main office in Saudi Arabia and 
three regional offices.
16
  
 The banks which operate in countries where the whole banking system is overseen in 
some way by religious bodies/institutions (like in Pakistan). 
 The banks which operate in Muslim countries and which co-exist with interest-based 
banks (for example in Jordan, Egypt, Malysia). 
 The Islamic banks in non-Muslim countries whose monetary authorities do not 
recognize their Islamic character (like the Al-Baraka International Bank in London 
and the Islamic Bank in Durban, South Africa). 
 The Islamic banks which exist in non-Muslim countries whose monetary authorities 
do recognize their Islamic character (for instance the Faisal International Bank, FIB 
based on Copenhagen, Denmark registered under the Danish Banking Supervisory 
Board). 
                                                             
12 The Islamic Bank acquires a tangible asset at the request of its customer. Then, the bank sells the asset to its 
customer on a deferred sales basis with a markup which corresponds to the profit of the bank. 
13 The Ijara transaction is similar to the conventional leasing transaction. However, in Ijara wa-iqtina the 
customer (the lesee) has the option of owing the asset at the end of the contract. 
14
 It is a leasing mode which is used to finance long term or large scale facilities involving like construction of 
manufacturer. Bank can either own the manufacturer and charge the customer a fee based on profits or sell it 
to the customer on a differed basis similarly like in the Murabaha transaction. 
15
 The Islamic bank and the customer invest jointly money into the venture. They agree on the sharing of profits 
and losses. 
16 Currently, the IDB has 55 member countries. All member countries must be also a member of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference and must pay their contribution to the capital of the bank and accept 
terms and conditions decided upon by the IDB Board of Governors. Its purpose is to support the economic 
development and social progress of member countries and Muslim communities. The IDB participates in equity 
capital and grants loans for productive projects and enterprises. 
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   Table (1) presents a glance on the presence of Islamic banking in Muslim and non-Muslim 
countries: 
 Islamic Banks (market share, MS) 
No Islamic 
Banks 
Marginal 
presence 
Small MS Medium MS High MS Government 
legislation 
Iraq Algeria Malaysia Bahrain Kuwait Iran 
Libya Lebanon Turkey Egypt Qatar Pakistan 
Morocco Tunisia Yemen Jordan  Sudan 
Oman   Saudi   
Syria   UAE   
 
A.3 Aims of the Islamic banking 
    The first Islamic banks were created to fill a gap in social and economic life of poor 
population. Their first aim is to support individuals by mobilizing their resources and 
increasing their awareness of savings. However, the current Islamic banks seem to support the 
idea that all the other banks (conventional banks) are illicit and have to be replaced by Islamic 
ones (Henry et al. 2004). 
    Islamic banks choose the projects which have the highest rate of profit and are the safest 
and the most socially beneficial. This is why we distinguish two sets of aims in the Islamic 
banking which are closely related: economic and social aims. 
1. Economic aims 
 To satisfy the demand and the financial operations of Muslims today in the framework 
of the principles and percepts of the shari'ah. 
 To invest the capital of Muslims into projects which are permissible by the Islamic law 
to generate licit profits. 
 To establish subsidiaries of Islamic banks in Muslim and non-Muslim countries 
through the implementation of innovative and various activities. 
 To capture the savings of hundreds of millions of Muslims who have never deposit 
their money in banks such as farmers and artisans. 
2. Social aims 
 To promote and consolidate co operations among Muslims. 
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 In addition to the economic promoting of Muslim countries, the Islamic Banking 
promotes also social development through the almsgiving (zakat)
17
 and the creation of 
funds employed in charitable works. 
B. Conventional versus Islamic Banks 
    There are some major differences between the conventional and the Islamic banking. As 
explained before, in contrast with conventional banks which have no business limitations, 
Islamic banks can finance only business not against the teachings of Islam. 
    Finances are given to the customer by a contract of loan (where the bank is the creditor and 
the customer is the debtor) in conventional banks and by a contract of a deferred sale contract 
in Islamic banks: first, the bank buys the goods that the customer requires or appoints him or 
her to do it on its behalf. Later, the bank sells them to the customer. The loan transaction in 
conventional banks is substituted for a buying and a selling transaction in the Islamic banks. 
The selling price is equal to the acquisition's cost plus an agreed profit margin. This price is 
the contracted amount that the customer must repay. 
    If the conventional banks earn their profit by financing the customers at a fixed interest 
rate, the return of the Islamic banks is given by the profits of their trading and investment 
activities: If they face some risks, these risks must be proportional to their efforts when they 
are studying the custumers' business and buying and selling the commodities required by their 
clients. 
    Given finances to the customer through a buying and selling transaction leads Islamic 
banks to face more risk than the conventional banks. In both, they have to take into account 
some risks as credit risks and currency fluctuation and liquidity risks, but only Islamic banks 
share loss as well as profit and they cannot compensate it with any additional charge: if the 
customer is unable to pay, the Islamic bank can neither ask for higher selling price because of 
the delayed settlement dues nor charge additional money such as penalities and compounded 
interest (Al-Omer and Abdul-Haq 1996). 
    Consequently, they have to examine and to understand the customers' investments very 
well. From the point of view of depositors, Islamic banks are less risky than the conventional 
ones (see among others Aggrawal and Yousaf 2000, Hassan and Bashir 2003, Yudistira 2003, 
Sufian 2007, Moin 2008). 
    Some non-Islamic banks in Egypt open "Islamic" branches. Ray (1995) reveals that eleven 
conventional banks are involved in Islamic banking business for different reasons such as 
competing with the Islamic ones but also to attempt to weaken the strongest ones. One can 
                                                             
17 Zakat institutionalizes the systematic giving of certain percentage (≃2.5%) of one's wealth each year to 
benefit the poor. It does not include charitable gifts given out of individual generosity and is not a replacement 
for taxes, but is seen as a form of compulsory worship, purification and redistribution. As it necessitates a 
regular reassessment of net wealth, Zakat is thought to help concentrate the mind in encouraging compliance 
with Shari'ah in all financial dealings (Alam, 2004). 
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notice however that, non-Islamic banks contribute therefore to the "Islamization" of the 
banking system in Egypt. 
   To end with, it is worth to note that people involved in the Islamic banking business are 
usually apolitical and some of them deal with both Islamic and conventional banks. In 
contrast with expectations, the Islamic banking is neither the monopoly of the Islamic 
movement nor of its founders (Ray, 1995 and Henry et all., 2004). 
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Appendix 2/ Tables and figures 
 
Table1: Estimate for the cost-efficiency frontier (Islamic banks) 
          
 
1   2   
  coefficient standard-error coefficient standard-error 
Constant -0,2025  ( 0,0484)*** -0,1033 (0, 0195)*** 
lnLOANS 0,1484 (0, 3019) 0,0000 (0, 0000)*** 
lnSECURITIES 0,7254 (0,2782)*** 0,1620 (0, 0271)*** 
lnLA 0,6601 (0,2665)** 0,0000 (0, 0000)*** 
ln PERSONEXP 0,0592 (0, 257) 0,6478 (0, 0363)*** 
lnLOANS*lnLOANS 0,0498 (0, 0429) 0,0000 (0, 0000)*** 
lnLOANS*lnSECURITIES -0,0771 (0, 083) 0,3428 (0, 0378)*** 
lnLOANS*lnLA 0,036 (0, 0406) 0,0000 (0, 0000)*** 
lnSECURITIES*lnSECURITIES 0,0705 (0, 056) 0,3811 (0, 0411)*** 
lnSECURITIES*lnLA -0,1598 (0,0697)** 0,0000 (0, 0000)*** 
lnLA*lnLA 0,0344 (0, 0229) 0,0099 (0, 0049)** 
lnPERSONEXP*lnPERSONEXP 0,1532 (0,0640)** 0,0000 (0, 0000) 
ln PERSONEX*-lnLOANS -0,0727 (0, 0907) 0,0202 (0, 0064)*** 
lnPERSONEXP*lnSECURITIES 0,1682 (0,0992)* 0,0000 (0, 0000) 
lnPERSONEXP*lnLA -0,1135 (0,0403)*** -0,0411 (0, 0045)*** 
          
Gamma 0,2801 (0,0749)*** 0,7939 (0, 1457)*** 
Log-likelihood ratio 15,22 164,41 
Number of observations 334 886 
     *, ** and *** significant at levels 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
(1) cost-frontier function with Islamic banks. 
(2) cost-frontier function with commercial banks of the selected countries.
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Table 2: Haussmann test 
    coefficients 
    fixed effects  random effects difference standard error 
lnLOANS 
 
0,3957 0,3995 -0,0038 0,0170 
lnSECURITIES 
 
0,1285 0,1290 -0,0005 0,0222 
lnLA 
 
0,4033 0,4004 0,0029 0,0139 
lnPERSONEXP 
 
0,4172 0,3464 0,0708 0,0386 
lnLOANS*lnLOANS 0,0769 0,0774 -0,0006 0,0023 
lnLOANS*lnSECURITIES -0,1145 -0,1167 0,0022 0,0051 
lnLOANS*lnLA 
 
-0,0212 -0,0205 -0,0007 0,0014 
lnSECURITIES*lnSECURITIES 0,1011 0,1021 -0,0010 0,0036 
lnSECURITIES*lnLA -0,0684 -0,0689 0,0005 0,0029 
lnLA*lnLA 
 
0,0329 0,0330 -0,0002 0,0007 
lnPERSONEXP*lnPERSONEXP -0,0003 -0,0059 0,0056 0,0032 
lnPERSONEXP*lnLOANS 0,0430 0,0339 0,0091 0,0046 
lnPERSONEXP*lnSECURITIES -0,0564 -0,0397 -0,0167 0,0086 
lnPERSONEXP*lnLA 0,0300 0,0284 0,0015 0,0019 
            
Probability > chi2        0,9664 
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Table 3: Statistics for the arguments of the cost-frontier function 
Variable   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      lnTOTALCOST overall 6,8564 2,1455 -0,4141 14,5537 
 
between 
 
2,1481 2,1309 14,5537 
 
within 
 
0,8524 2,9451 9,1508 
      lnLOANS overall 5,1795 2,5465 -2,7988 10,4183 
 
between 
 
2,4195 -2,1652 9,7068 
 
within 
 
0,9667 -2,3657 7,7873 
      lnSECURITIES overall 6,1571 2,1968 -2,5344 10,7905 
 
between 
 
2,0720 0,7703 9,9131 
 
within 
 
0,8574 0,5797 8,6233 
      lnLA overall 4,5557 2,3734 -3,3302 9,3142 
 
between 
 
2,1677 -1,5618 8,1801 
 
within 
 
1,0172 -0,1042 7,8581 
      lnPERSONEXP overall 0,0197 1,7043 -4,2028 17,8739 
 
between 
 
2,2166 -3,5738 16,7185 
 
within 
 
0,3832 -1,6673 2,4077 
      SIZE overall 43,1454 333,6532 -1,6094 4986,9930 
 
between 
 
253,9436 2,1570 2067,1260 
 
within 
 
207,4721 -1538,0430 2963,0120 
      ROA overall 0,0191 0,0733 -0,8000 0,5399 
 
between 
 
0,0618 -0,2167 0,3326 
 
within 
 
0,0531 -0,5642 0,3660 
      ROE overall 0,1174 0,2909 -1,1514 4,6680 
 
between 
 
0,2191 -1,1514 0,9374 
 
within 
 
0,2411 -1,1628 4,2003 
      RISKTAKING overall 0,2372 0,2318 -0,2000 1,0000 
 
between 
 
0,2090 0,0393 0,9461 
 
within 
 
0,1184 -0,3217 0,8567 
      MARKETPOWER overall 0,1324 0,2006 0,0000 0,9758 
 
between 
 
0,1825 0,0000 0,7408 
  within   0,0655 -0,1526 0,4372 
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Table 4: Correlation between determinants of cost-efficiency 
  SIZE ROA ROE RISKTAKING MARKETPOWER GDPCP GDPCT DPOP DMDE 
          SIZE 1 
        
          ROA 0,0798 1 
       
          ROE 0,0366 0,4540* 1 
      
          RISKTAKING 0,0308 0,2054* -0,0943* 1 
     
          MARKETPOWER 0,009 0,094 0,034 -0,0959 1 
    
          GDPCP 0,0962* 0,1830* 0,0865* 0,2144* 0,0677 1 
   
          GDPCT 0,0793* 0,1578* 0,0503 0,2446* 0,025 0,9210* 1 
  
          DPOP -0,0209 0,1256* -0,0065 0,3399* 0,1947* 0,2053* 0,1724* 1 
 
          DMDE -0,0278 0,1815* 0,0559 0,2725* -0,0503 0,2665* 0,3769* 0,3892* 1 
*, ** and *** significant at levels 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
 
26 
 
Table 5: Tobit model for explanatory variables of scores efficiency 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CONSTANT 0,829 0,8293 0,8322 0,854 0,8318 0,8497 0,7928 
   (0,0122)*** (0,0122)***  (0,0137)***  (0,0146)*** (0,0138) (0,0149) (0,0161)*** 
SIZE 0,014 0,0115 0,0186 0,0352 0,0158 0,0329 0,0074 
  (0,0138) (0,014) (0,0148) (0,0158)** (0,015) (0,0159)** (0,0125) 
ROA -0,0298 -0,0293 -0,0221 -0,0265 -0,022 -0,0275 -0,0391 
  (0,0135)** (0,0136)** (0,0145) (0,0142)* (0,0146) (0,014)**  (0,0119)*** 
MARKET POWER -0,0238 -0,0214 (0,0145) -0,0221 -0,0232 -0,0255 -0,0034 
  (0,0137)* (0,0139) (0,0145) (0,014) (0,0145) (0,0141)* (0,0121) 
DPOP 
  
(0,0145) 
 
-0,0276 
 
  
  
  
(0,0145) 
 
(0,0178) 
 
  
URBANPOPPERC 
   
-0,055 
 
-0,055   
  
   
(0,0176) 
 
(0,0166)***   
GDPC 
  
0,0334 -0,0018 0,0348 0,0239   
  
  
 (0,0189)* (0,0161)  (0,0191)* (0,0174)   
RISKTAKING 
  
-0,0227 0,0039 -0,0242 -0,013   
  
  
(0,0194) (0,0163) (0,0197) (0,0198)   
D_middle-EAST 
      
-0,0096 
  
      
(0,0136) 
D_UK 
      
-0,1395 
  
      
(0,0401)*** 
D_islamicbkgsystem 
      
-0,0035 
  
      
(0,0148) 
D_subprime 
      
0,129 
  
      
 (0,0123)*** 
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Prob> chi2 0,03 0,05 0,04 0,00 0,06 0,00 0,00 
Log-likelihood 228,23 224,51 230,52 233,98 226,79 230,95 279,11 
Number of observations 334 334 334 334 334 334 334 
 
*, ** and *** significant at levels 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Regressions 2,5 and 6 are run on a sample excluding UK islamics banks.   
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Table 6: Tobit estimate for the determinants of efficiency for commercial banks of    
selected countries 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
CONSTANT 0.8172  0.8191  0.8189 0.8249 0.8193 
 
(0.0094)*** (0.0113)*** (0 .0113)*** (0.0125)***  (0.0113)*** 
SIZE .0051 0.0067 0 .0060  0.0038  0.0047 
 
(0.0119)  (0.0122) (0.0134)  (0.0128) (0.0129) 
ROA -.0159 
    
 
(0 .0111) 
    ROE 
 
 -0.0201  -0.0203    -0.0200    -0 .0210 
  
(0.0113)*  (0.0114)*   (0.0113)* (0.0114)* 
MARKET POWER 0 .0265 0 .0268  0.0268  0.0287 0.0272 
 
 (0.0111)** (0.0118**  (0.0113)** (0.0114)**  (0.0113)** 
DPOP 
 
0 .0065  0.0058    -0.0165 
 
  
(0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0156) 
 URBANPOPPERC 
    
 0.0072 
     
(0.0339) 
GDPC 
 
0.0003  0.0017  0.0126   -0.0036 
  
(0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0341) 
RISKTAKING 
 
 -0.0020  -0.0025    -0.0011      - 0.0022 
  
(0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0124)  (0.0123) 
            
Prob> chi2  0.02 0,09 0,09  0.06 0.09 
Log-likelihood  369.27 369.96 369.97 370.48 369.95 
Number of 
observations 537 537 537 537 537 
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Figure 1: Evolution of Islamic banks efficiency from 2001-2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of commercial banksefficiency in selected countries from 2001-2008 
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Figure 3: Evolution for selected statistics of commercial and Islamic Banks in the 
selected countries 
 
 
 
 
a- Commercial banks in Middle East   b- Islamic banks in Middle East 
 
c- Commercial Banks in Asia     d- Islamic Banks in Asia 
 
e-  Commercial Banks in Africa    f- Islamic banks in Africa 
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g- Commercial Banks in UK    h- Islamic Banks in UK 
 
Source : Bankscope, Bureau Vandijk, 2009 
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